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Abstract
In this paper we solve a monetary policy game where a gov-
ernment appoints a completely independent central banker whose
preferences from a point of view of private agents are private infor-
mation. We show that a bit of private information is su–cient to
eliminate any incentive for the goverment to precommit monetary
policy to a conservative agent: both in a separating equilibrium
and in a pooling equilibrium the central banker’s optimal degree
of conservativeness is the same as the government’s one.
*Department of Economics, University of Salerno, Ponte don
Melillo, Fisciano, Salerno, Italy
**Department of Economics, University of Modena, Via Beren-
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1 Introduction
The relationship between "society" and the agent in charge of mon-
etary policy has been focused by recent literature as one of the main
issues in the economic analysis of monetary policymaking, (see Persson
and Tabellini, 1997, for a recent survey). The starting point for much
of the recent literature has been a work by Kydland and Prescott (1977)
who showed how, in a monetary policy game between a monetary author-
ity and private agents the precommitment solution for the policymaker
welfare dominates any discretionary solution. Rogofi (1985) interpreted
their result as the possibility for a government prone to the temptation
for in°ation surprise to delegate monetary policy to an agent (central
banker-CB henceforth) who does not take into account the beneflts that
unexpected in°ation may have on government’s target variables (unem-
ployment, service on outstanding nominal public debt). Rogofi (1985)
also showed that, in a model with nominal rigidity and scope for stabi-
lization policy, the optimal CB’s preferences are not such that the agent
in charge for monetary policy sets an inflnite weight on the in°ation rate,
though his preferences penalize in°ation more than the median voter
does1. This is the celebrated Rogofi’s result about the convenience for
a Government to commit monetary policy to an independent and \con-
servative" CB though not an inflnitely conservative one, by trading ofi a
certain amount of °exibility in the policy response for credibility.
The crucial hypothesis for this result is that the preferences of the
1See Alesina and Grilli (1992) for an explicit reinterpretation of the Rogo®'s model
in terms of a political game where a population of citizens, di®ering only with respect
to the relative weight which they assign to in°ation and stabilisation, votes upon the
preferences of the \governor" to appoint. For an alternative approach on the analysis
of the relationship between "society" and the agent in charge of monetary policy
see Walsh (1995) and Persson and Tabellini (1993). Persson and Tabellini (1997),
pp. 37 ss. o®er a critical analysis of the main di®erences and analogies between the
precommitment and the contracting approach to the normative analysis of monetary
policy making.
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appointed CB are common knowledge among the players of the game.
Difierent authors2 have emphasised that the environment in which the
policymaker makes decisions is characterised by the presence of asym-
metric information by the policymaker on its own preferences about al-
ternative objectives to which policy is targeted. In the case of private
information the action of the policymaker is constrained by private agents
beliefs, but also has scope for policy actions that would be inefiective in
the presence of complete information.
In this paper we ask whether the \conservative CB" result still holds
in the presence of CB’s private information on its preferences. To answer
this question we consider a simple model as in Barro and Gordon (1983)
and as in Vickers (1986)3. The model is easily summarised: at time t=0
(delegation stage) a government is elected endowed with preferences over
in°ation and unexpected in°ation and delegates monetary policy to a CB
in charge for two periods whose preferences are private information. At
time t=1 (monetary policy stage), given agents expectations, the CB will
set the in°ation rate taking into account the fact that future expectations
(at time t=2) by private agents will be set conditional on the observation
of the CB’s current choice. 4. We consider both pooling and separating
2The issue of private information in monetary policy games has been analysed,
for example, by Backus and Dri±l (1985), Canzonery (1985), Rogo® (1987), Vickers
(1986).
3The question we address in this paper naturally arises in Rogo® (1985) who states:
\We have assumed that the preferences of the agent appointed to head the central
bank is well known. Clearly many strategic problems arise when this assumption
is relaxed". However our analysis is cast in the original set up used by Barro and
Gordon (1983) and extended by Vickers (1986) to the case of private information.
This is mainly due to computational di±culties originating by the fact that the ¯rst
order condition to the Government's problem, de¯ned by eq. 22a in Rogo® (1985)
does not have closed form solution. Di®erently from Rogo® (1985), in the original set
up used here there is no trade o® between °exibility and credibility and, as it will be
seen in a moment, the choice of the government trades o® the possibility to exploit
private information and credibility.
4Vickers (1986) shows that the sub game played by the CB at time 1 is a signalling
game with both a separating and a pooling equilibrium strategies. He also shows that
only the separating equilibrium survives the application of some re¯nement criteria.
Di®erently from Vickers we analyse the signalling sub-game under the hypothesis of a
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equilibrium and show how, in either case, the incentive to exploit the
CB’s degree of conservativeness as a commitment device is modifled by
the presence of private information.
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows: in section 2 we
outline the model and deflne the separating equilibrium and the pooling
equilibrium in the monetary policy sub-game; in section 3 we derive the
optimal CB’s degree of conservativeness set by the government in the
delegation stage; in section 4 we conclude.
2 Equilibria in the monetary policy signalling game
The model is described as follows: at time zero a Government char-
acterised by the preferences of his median voter is elected and appoints
a CB in charge for two periods whose preferences about the trade ofi be-
tween the costs of in°ation versus the beneflts from unexpected in°ation5
are private information from the point of view of private agents. In each
of the two periods when it is in charge, the CB plays a two stage sub-
game vis µa vis private agents such that: in the flrst stage agents set their
expectations about the in°ation rate to be played by the CB and, given
this expected level of in°ation, they set nominal contracts. In the second
stage, after observing contracts set by private agents, the CB sets out the
optimal in°ation rate. The incentive to reveal private information for the
CB arises since private agents, setting contracts in the flrst stage of the
second period will condition their expectations on what they observed in
continuum of types that the CB may incarnate. Then we solve for the optimal CB's
type that the government may want to select under either equilibrium.
5 See Cukiermann (1993) for a detailed exposition of the main issues and in-
terpretations involved in the use of this utility function as a charcterisation of the
government objectives.
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the second stage of the flrst period. The pay ofi to the CB is given by:
Wt = ¡1
2
…2
t
¡ fi (…e
t
¡ …t) (1)
where fi > 0 represents the preference parameter that describes
CB’s relative weight set on unexpected in°ation, fi 2 [a; A] is private
information to the CB i.e., from the point of view of private agents, it
is distributed according to F (fi),6 t indicates the period of the game. …t
is the in°ation rate which, for the sake of simplicity is assumed to be a
perfectly controlled instrument, …e
t
represents expected in°ation7.
Private agents seek to minimize forecast error on in°ation rate ac-
cording to the following per period payofi function8:
ut = ¡ (…t ¡ …et )2 (2)
We solve the monetary policy game for the Bayes Nash equilib-
rium strategies and we obtain a couple of in°ation rates played by CB:
s = f…1(fi); …2(fi)g, and a couple of expected in°ation rates played by
private agents: e = f…e
1
; …e
2
g, where …e
1
= E(…1) represents the flrst period
expected in°ation rate based on the prior beliefs and …e
2
= E(…2 j …1)
represents the second period expected in°ation rate contingent on the
actual in°ation rate observed in the flrst period and it is set according
to the Bayes rule.
Lemma 1
For any arbitrary support [a; A] of F (fi), a separating equilibrium
exists in the range [fis; A]. Equilibrium strategies are the following ones:
ss = f…1(fi); …2(fi)g, es = f…e1; …e2g;
6 Both the support and the distribution function are common knowledge and can
be arbitrarily de¯ned. However, it can be shown that, conditions for the existence of
a separating equilibrium may restrict the support, cfr. Mailath (1987).
7 See Cukierman (1993), pp. 34 e ss., for a critical analysis of the welfare function
and the macroeconomic structure used in monetary policy games.
8 For a thorough discussion of (2) see Rogo® (1987, p.146).
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where …s
1
(fi) = `(fi), …¤
2
(fi) = fi, …e
1
(fi) = E[`(fi)], …e
2
(fi) = E(…2 j
…1) = fi.
…s
1
(fi) = `(fi) satisfles the following flrst order non linear difierential
equation:
dÁ
d®
= ®
®¡Á
and is such that 0 < `(fi) < …¤
1
(fi) = fi.
Proof see Appendix
The separating strategy is such that, in the flrst period any CB
in the range [fis; A), will select an in°ation rate lower than under com-
plete information (reducing the in°ationary bias). Private agents will
anticipate this and will lower the expected level of in°ation in the flrst
period.9
In a signalling game such as this one there will also exist many
pooling equilibria. A natural candidate for a pooling is the one in which
the CB in the flrst period plays a pooling strategy that validates agents
prior beliefs. This result is described in the following lemma.
Lemma 2
A candidate for a pooling equilibrium is described by the following
strategies spf…p1(fi); …p2(fi)g, ep = f…e1; …e2g where, …p1(fi) = „fi, …p2(fi) = fi,
…e
1
(fi) = „fi, …e
2
(fi) = „fi. When out of equilibrium beliefs are such that
after observing any deviation from …p1(fi) = „fi, agents will set …
e
2
(fi) =
A, this pooling equilibrium exists for fi 2
h
A¡pA2 ¡ „fi2; A
i
. When
out of equilibrium beliefs are such that agents do not update beliefs
after observing any deviation (passive conjectures), deviation is always
worthwhile and the pooling equilibrium does not exist.
Proof See Appendix
9 A graphic characterisation of the separating equilibrium is in D' Amato and
Pistoresi (1996). The analytical solution for the separating schedule is provided in
the appendix.
5
3 The optimal CB’s degree of conservativeness when
his preferences are private information
In this section we analyse the optimal strategy of a government
that is willing to appoint a CB but is not able to release to private
agents credible information about the CB’s preferences about the trade
ofi between the cost of in°ation and the beneflts of unexpected in°ation10.
We flnally come to the main point of the paper: in the economic
framework outlined in the previous section, is it still the case that a
government (i.e. a median voter) with given preferences has the incentive
to appoint a conservative CB?11 To answer this question consider that
at the outset of the monetary policy game played by CB a government is
elected and is willing to appoint a completely independent12 CB whose
preferences are not common knowledge.
As a benchmark, consider the case when the CB’ s type is com-
plete information, then the monetary policy outcome will be the usual
in°ationary equilibrium played in the two periods. Under complete in-
formation on the preferences of the CB it is immediate to show that the
optimal solution would be such that fi = 0 (precommitment solution).
10 As it is well known, a less extreme solution than \precommitment" (Kydland
and Prescott, 1977) is provided in Rogo® (1985) where it is assumed that the CB's
preferences are complete information, in his setting, rather than an in¯nite penalty
on in°ation, the median voter, (\society") will be willing to appoint a \conservative"
CB, weighting in°ation more than the median voter itself.
11 A problem similar to the one analysed in this section is analysed and solved by
Ziv (1993) in the context of information sharing among oligopolists.
12Complete independence of the CB in the monetary policy game makes the infor-
mation about the Goverment's type irrelevant for the private agents. In this case the
contract between the CB and the government only has internal relevance and there is
no point for the government to reveal its own preferences. On the same ground there
is no point for the government in revealing the CB's preferences any announcement
would not be credible.
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When the CB holds private information about its preferences we
have two possible cases: either a separating or a pooling equilibrium
strategies will be played by the CB13. Assuming that the monetary pol-
icy game equilibrium is a separating equilibrium, the government will
take into account that the appointed CB must satisfy the incentive com-
patibility constraint for truthful revelation described in Lemma 1 and
given by (A2) in the Appendix.14 When the equilibrium outcome of the
monetary policy game is assumed to be in pooling strategies, the gov-
ernment will take into account that the CB’s behaviour will be described
by strategies and constrained by beliefs as in Lemma 2. Let us solve the
program for the government in either case.
The payofi function for the government is given by:
WG = ¡…2
1
=2¡ fiG […e
1
¡ …1(fi)]¡ …22=2¡ fiG […e2 ¡ …2(fi)] (3)
where fiG represents the government’s preference parameter for sur-
prise in°ation, and fi represents the CB’s preferences in charge of mon-
etary policy for the next two periods and represents the government’s
choice variable.
Given a separating equilibrium, the reduced form of equation (3),
is given by:
WGs = ¡1
2
[`(fi)]2 ¡ fiG [E(`(fi))¡ ` (fi)]¡ 1
2
fi2 (4)
Given a pooling equilibrium, the reduced form of equation 3 is given
by:
WGp = ¡1
2
fi2 ¡ 1
2
fi2 ¡ fiG(fi¡ fi) (5)
13Di®erently from Vickers (1986), we do not apply re¯nement criteria in order to
check if some of the equilibria can be eliminated. The main reason being that, under
the hypothesis of continuity of types no re¯nement criterium can be safely applied.
See Mailath (1987), (1992).
14 Notice that, since the action of the CB is observable in the present model, the
same solution can be obtained if the government, instead of appointing a CB with
suitable preferences sets an in°ation target in the two periods.
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The optimal CB’s degree of conservativeness can be obtained by
maximising (4) and (5) with respect to fi. We get the following proposi-
tion
Proposition 1
In the political stage of the game given either (i) a separating or
(ii) a pooling equilibrium in the monetary policy game, the optimal CB’s
degree of conservativeness is the same as that of the government, i.e.
fiG = fi.
Proof
As for (i), the flrst order condition will be given by: WGs® = ¡``0+
fiG`0 ¡ fi = 0. Using equation (A.2) for `0, derived in the Appendix and
described in Lemma 1, we get (fiG ¡ fi)=(fi ¡ `) = 0, which is satisfled
for fiG = fi. In the Appendix we will show that this is a su–cient for a
global maximum.
As for (ii), the flrst order condition will be given by WGp® = ¡fi +
fiG = 0. The second order condition is satisfled since WGp®® = ¡1.
Let us discuss now the reasons why, under private information of
the CB on its preferences parameter, any incentive for the government
to appoint a \conservative CB" disappears. Consider flrst the case of
a separating equilibrium. In such an equilibrium, the appointment of a
conservative CB will imply delegation costs in the flrst period and ben-
eflts in the second period. The flrst period cost is due to the fact that
by appointing a CB with fi < fiG implies that the CB will set a level of
in°ation lower than the one that would be selected by the government
in the absence of delegation. This will prevent a weak government to
exploit reduction in the expected in°ation by private agents and will in-
°ict \strong" types of governments separating costs that are higher than
in the absence of delegation. In the second period, when the equilib-
rium outcome is just the in°ationary equilibrium, the appointment of a
conservative CB would beneflt any type of government. For the selected
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speciflcation of the payofi functions, the cost of appointing a conserva-
tive CB will exactly counterbalance the beneflts, this explains point (i)
in proposition 1. In the pooling equilibrium considered here things are
slightly difierent, since the flrst period in°ation rate is constrained by
prior beliefs, the choice of the banker is completely irrelevant for the flrst
period outcome. Hence a rational government will trade-ofi only beneflts
and costs in the second period of the game. In this case a weak govern-
ment will not waste the opportunity to artiflcially booming the economy
by surprise in°ation and hence will not select a conservative CB. A strong
type of Government, on the other hand, will not like appointing a con-
servative CB since this latter will trigger a de°ation in the second period
which is larger than the de°ation that the government itself is willing to
pay in order to keep in°ation low.
4 Conclusions
In this paper we have shown that when the government appoints a
CB in charge for two periods, whose preferences are private information,
the optimal degree of conservativeness is the same as the government’s
one. That is, private information, in the form considered in this paper,
eliminates any incentive for society to appointing a CB whose preferences
penalise in°ation more than the median voter. The intuition for the
result is that the introduction of private information on CB’ s preferences
increases the cost for government’s commitment up to the level that in
the optimum, it will not be used to constrain future behaviour of the
government. The general implication of our result, for the institutional
design indicate that in the case of uncertainty of the public about the true
CB preferences a simple commitment argument can not be considered
as a sound foundation for the set up of strategic setting of goals and
legislative features shielding central banks from political pressures.
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However this implication can not be taken too far since, as stated
above, we analysed a monetary policy game within a model where the
trade ofi between credibility and °exibility is not present. However the
simple mode analysed in this paper can be safely considered relevant in
circumstances where the surprise in°ation is a strong temptation for the
government regardless of the shocks that may hit the economy (stabili-
sation motive). An interesting task left for future work will be to set the
same question addressed in the present paper within a model where the
trade-ofi between °exibility and credibility is present. The point made
here, however, is very likely to carry over: signalling costs increase with
the degree of conservativeness of the CB and tend to countervail the
beneflts of commitment.
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A Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1
By backward induction let us solve flrst the second period equilib-
rium outcome. This is obtained by maximisingW2 = ¡…22=2¡fi (…e2 ¡ …2)
so that the CB will select: …2 = fi. Private agents, to minimize error
forecasts, will set expectations given by …e
2
= E(fi j …1 = `) = f^i.
Given the equilibrium outcome of the second period, the reduced
form pay-ofi function to the CB in the flrst period is given by:
~W = ¡1
2
…2
1
¡ fi (E(…1)¡ …1)¡ fi2=2¡ fi (f^i¡ fi) (A1)
The separating strategy will be obtained by maximising (A1) with
respect to …1 subject to …1 = `(fi), and …
e
2
= f^i = `¡1(fi) . However,
before solving this program, we need to check that (A1) satisfles regular-
ity conditions for a separating equilibrium as stated in Mailath (1987).
Belief monotonicity condition: ~W
b®
= ¡fi < 0 , (the CB has incentive
to be believed an in°ation flghter, i.e. low ); Type monotonicity con-
dition: ~W
¼1®
= 1 > 0 , (that is the larger the weight that CB sets
on unexpected in°ation the larger the welfare efiect of increasing …1 for
any given belief of private agents); Single crossing condition is given by:
@( ~W
¼1
= ~W
®^
)=@fi = ¡…1=(¡fi)2, which is satisfled since it does not change
sign for a positive in°ation rate.
The flrst order condition for maximising (A1) will yield
d`
dfi
=
fi
fi¡ ` (A2)
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A su–cient condition for (A2) to be a local maximiser for (A1) is
the following one (see Mailath, 1987,p.1355): `0 ~W
¼1®
+ ~W
b®®
‚ 0 and
hence, since …1 2 `, and ~W
b®®
= ¡1 and ~W
¼1®
= 1, we get the following
restriction on `: `0 > 1 the is, from (A2), ` > 0.
A su–cient condition for (A2) to be a global maximiser for (A1), is
the following one `0
n
~W
¼1®
¡ ( ~W
¼1
= ~Wb®) ~W®b®
o
‚ 0, which is satisfled for
`0 f1¡ (fi ¡ `)=fig ‚ 0, i.e. for 0 • ` • fi. This completes the proof of
Lemma 1.
Equation (A2) can be solved by separating the variables and inte-
grating to obtain the implicit function describing the separating strategy.
A characterisation theorem in Mailath (1987), p.1353, plus an initial con-
dition will allow us to select the relevant branch of the implicit function as
the unique separating equilibrium strategy. In particular, set ` = fi ¢ u,
and after some algebra write equation (A2) in the following separable
form: 1¡u
1¡(1¡u)udu =
1
®
dfi. By integrating both members and by elim-
inating the auxiliary variable u, we get the following implicit solution:
1p
3
Arc tan
³
2u¡1p
3
´
¡ 1
2
log (1¡ u+ u2) = logfi + k, where k represents
the constant of integration which can be obtained by the initial value
condition, `(A) = A. This solution is such that the relevant branch
of the separating strategy is an increasing convex function such that,
0 • ` • fi, `(A) = A, and 1 • `0 < 1. Numerical simulations show-
ing contourplots of the implicit function above by using Mathematica
conflrm the characterisation.
Proof of lemma 2
Consider flrst out of equilibrium conjectures such that, observing
any deviation from equilibrium strategy, private agents will set expecta-
tions for the second period to the in°ation rate that would be selected
by the worst possible type that the CB may incarnate in the support,
i.e. …e
2
= A . In this case beneflts from deviation will be given by
W d = fi2 ¡ fi(„fi + A). Welfare from a pooling strategy will be given by
W p = (fi2 ¡ 2fi„fi ¡ „fi2)=2 . Hence, deviation will be worthwhile for any
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type in the support if W d > W p, i.e. fi2¡fi(„fi+A) > (fi2¡ 2fi„fi¡ „fi2)=2
which is satisfled if fi2 ¡ 2Afi + „fi2 > 0, that is for values of outside the
values of the two roots fii = A ¤
p
A2 ¡ „fi2. This implies that devia-
tion is worthwhile for fi 2 [a; A¡pA2 ¡ „fi2], on the other hand, pooling
equilibrium will exist in the range fi 2 [A¡pA2 ¡ „fi2; A].
Consider now out of equilibrium beliefs deflned by passive conjec-
tures (no updating after deviation), to obtain welfare from deviation
substitute …1 = fi and …
e
2
= „fi and obtainW d = fi2¡2fi„fi , so that devia-
tion is worthwhile if fi2¡ 2fi„fi > (fi2¡ 2fi„fi¡ „fi2)=2, that is (fi¡ „fi)2 > 0,
which is always satisfled.
Proof of proposition 1
Given a pooling equilibrium, the optimality of fiG = fi has been
proved in the text.
Given a separating equilibrium a su–cient condition for fiG = fi to
be the optimal CB’s type would be that (4) is a concave function in fi
. However we will show that, though (4) is not globally concave in fi,
fiG = fi is a global maximiser.
To show that (4) is not globally concave we computeWG®® = ¡(`0)2+
(fiG¡`)`00¡1 and use `0 = fi=(fi¡`), and hence `00 = (fi`0¡`)=(fi¡`)2.
From the characterisation of ` in Lemma 1,we know that it is a convex
increasing function in fi, i.e. `00(fi) > 0.
Though (4) is not globally concave, we can show that for any fiG <
fi (fiG > fi), WG is always increasing (decreasing). To this aim consider
the inequality
WG® = ``
0 + fiG`0 ¡ fi > 0 (A3)
substitute the deflnition of `0 from (A2) and get: [¡fi` + fiGfi ¡
fi(fi ¡ `)]=(fi ¡ `) > 0. In a separating equilibrium (fi ¡ `) < 0, so
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condition (A3) will be equivalent to ¡fi`+fiGfi¡fi(fi¡`) < 0, i.e. (A3)
holds for fi < fiG. By reverting inequality (A3) we immediately obtain
that WG is always decreasing for fi > fiG. This proves the result.
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